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PALACE. The Supreme Court in American Life. By John P.

Frank. New York: Knopf. 1958. Pp. xi, 302, x. $5.

The new assertiveness of the Supreme Court has encouraged fresh appraisal of its role in the American culture. Mr. Frank thinks that perhaps
the oddest aspect of the uproar, to use his words, is the sense of surprise
that goes with it. For, on at least four occasions in the past-1803, 1857,
1895, and 1935-the value of the Court in the American system was brought
into sharp challenge. Despite the authority of Holmes to the contrary, the
Court did not then dwell in the quiet of the storm center as these controversies lashed the political countryside. The justices stood in the full
sweep of the blow, gowns whipping like sails, writs racing like scud. And
when the fury abated, the Court was not always without hurt. It took
time to recover from the Dred Scott case and the Bloody Assizes of 1935
and 1936, but recovery was eventually complete, and the Court may be
expected to survive the current disturbance.
In the present controversy state judges have recently rebuked the Court
by unprecedented resolution. Eminent deans like Erwin Griswold have
counseled patience, calmness, and understanding. The distinguished
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Learned Hand has argued that the justices more faithfully served their
highest and most noble function when they exercised the celebrated reserve that Stone advised them to maintain in the Butler case. Publishing
before the cases in the 1957 term, Bernard Schwartz, in an otherwise excellent book, prematurely greeted the Court's seeming withdrawal from
gross intervention in the legislative process as a long needed constitutional
revolution. Long ago, however, in a brilliant article, Walton Hamilton
and George Braden had warned that the Court had not adjourned but
merely recessed, and so it has proved. The Marble Palace by John P. Frank
is one of the latest of the works stimulated by the new interest in the Court.
Mr. Frank is the author of what many in the universities and collegescertainly in political science departments and perhaps elsewhere-quickly
judged to be the best case book in constitutional ·law in a decade and a half
when it first appeared in 1952. The essays introducing groups of cases
were thoughtful and scholarly expositions of the work of the Court in the
political context in which it can most fruitfully be understood; and many
highlights of comment and perception gleamed in a rich and smooth text.
He talked of the law of the Court like an informed student of politics.
In his latest work, he talks of the politics of the Court like a lawyer. For
him, the "marble palace," though distant from people who do not live
in marble palaces, and this means most, is a haven for fine fellows who
do and should exercise autonomous political power, and who are probably
saving the people from the excesses of democracy, although they are not
doing it very well.
This new book on the Supreme Court is divided about half and half
between shop talk and a summary analysis of groups of cases under general
headings. It seems to be an effort to write for a popular audience, that is,
one without a technical background in either the cases or the history of
the Court. The first seven chapters comprise the shop talk; and the next
eight constitute the summary statement of the work of the Court in important areas. In the shop talk chapters, Mr. Frank draws upon his own
experiences at the bar, as a clerk to Mr. Justice Black, and upon a -large
number of judicial biographies; and under appropriate headings he discusses the practicalities of power, the justices as people, the Chief Justices
as people, methods of persuasion in litigation before the Court, and methods
of decision. There is also a chapter on the law as literature, the burden of
which is that most judges don't write well.
In the next eight chapters, the author sets the table of discussion with
"The Court and Democratic Theory," and then serves a menu of special
functions of the Court-consideration of its work in holding the balance
between the Federal Government and the states, and among the three
branches of the Federal Government; its work on speech and press; color
and crime; the regulation of the economy; and the conduct of international
relations. A final chapter discusses the future of the Court in a burst of
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rhetoric containing one apostrophe (pp. 292-293) that goes on for 29 lines.
The range of comment in the shop talk chapters is very wide, and
much of it is very interesting. In the phrase of one of the local dialects of
social science, Mr. Frank was a "participant-observer" in the Court, and
he communicates something of the fascination of close and continuous involvement with fateful affairs. Here is a melange of insights born of the
author's experience and reinforced here and there out of the experience
of judges now long dead. Here too are ironical obliquities, the expressive
familiarities of craftsmen who see through, but still ·love, an ancient and
enduring institution they serve-monkish jokes about the church. The
shop talk is long on ancedote and short on interpretation, which is the
way good shop talk should be; and some of it is written in a colloquial
idiom that may or may not bring it and the author close to the reader.
Thus in speaking of the lawyer whose precious time is being used up by
hectoring judges with excessive questions, Mr. Frank says, "This can be
terrible. It happens." (p. 105) In speaking of a view held by the Court:
"Some rule of law." (p. 146) Or a badly briefed and inadequately argued
case may require the justices to "shoot from the hip," whether through the
robes or outside, it is not said. (p. 114)
Mr. Frank is concerned as a craftsman with points of style; and although his scholarly work has a brilliance and clarity that this more
popular effort lacks, yet the words spring easily into the consciousness and
the flow of meaning they bear is smooth and sustained. In the chapter on
the law as literature, he thinks that lawyers and judges produce little of
literary value, and deplores the euphuistic opacities of Frankfurter. He
thinks that much of the responsibility for this lack of higher literacy rests
upon the system of legal education,· that Socratic law school professors
embarrass students and thereby encourage the manufacture of elliptical
answers, festooned with dependent clauses beginning with words like "if"
and "but." This does not sound' like a very convincing explanation for
a condition that existed centuries before the law schools were established,
and Mr. Frank thinks that it might be "speculative and shaky." (p. 140)
Perhaps the sociology of the -law and not the education of the lawyers
provides a clue to the clots of jargon that disfigure the speech of lawyers
and the writings of the judges. The bar and the bench are brotherhoods,
status groups who use a specialized vocabulary through which they communicate with each other, and by means of which they identify the initiate
and exclude the merely vulgar from the mysteries. The gangs of New Yorkthe Purple Dragons and the Royal Egyptians-are also brotherhoods who,
within the group, habitually employ an esoteric idiom. Rabelais understood the historic propensity of the bar very well; and Hamlet upon looking into an empty skull (a lawyer's he thought) asked where now were
the quiddities, the quillets, cases, tenures and tricks. In the beginning was
the word, and ever since, the command of jargon has been a badge of
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power and status. Whatever the original justification for words of art may
have been or is, the institutionalization of bad prose may be a form of
secrecy, not free of ulteriority. But this may be as speculative and shaky
as the explanation of Mr. Frank.
There is frequent reference even in the shop talk chapters to the cases
of the Court and some of these references, as well as remarks about some
of the judges, require comment. For example, Mr. Frank lists "outstanding
pre-Civil War Justices" to make the point that most of the best ones did
not have previous judicial experience before appointment to the Court.
And then he sets out a post-Civil War list (p. 43) that includes, among
others, George Sutherland and Pierce Butler. However arguable the presence of Sutherland might be in a list of the best justices since the Civil
War, Butler surely has no place in it, and one would not think Brewer
either. Later references to Butler contradict his elevation by the author
to the ranks of the best. Thus, Mr. Frank refers to. Butler's ruthless domination of the University of Minnesota during World War I; (pp. 49-50)
and he comes to speak of him as "one of the most extreme examples" of
the lack of judicial temperament in the history of the Court. (p. 67) Such
contradictions leave the impression that some of the text was dictated
but not read.
There are other peculiarities. The issue in the Income Tax cases was
not whether the "government could constitutionally take two percent of
incomes over twenty thousand dollars." (p. 88) It is inexact to say that
the rule of the Dred Scott case was "that slaves could not be kept out of
the territories." (p. 34) Although the Dies Committee in the late thirties
created a sensation, to say of it that it reopened the old wars over speech
and press may underestimate the significance of the Fish Committee in the
early thirties and the McCormick-Dickstein Committee in the middle
thirties. (p. 188) The Court, says Mr. Frank, "helps to keep the democratic
machine in balance and to prevent it from running off wildly in one direction or another." (p. 157) Just why a democracy should not be allowed to
run off wildly in any direction it chooses is not clear to persons free of the
Federalist mystique.
These are minor peccancies, scarcely worth mentioning, and deservedly
overlooked if the principal statement of the text had been without blemish;
but here there are big issues of interpretation that Mr. Frank does not
resolve, two at least. The first is whether there is room in a democracy for·
an aristocracy of the robe. The second is whether the Court should have
one standard or a double standard in dealing with civil -liberties and
economic regulations. In discussing the first question, Mr. Frank does not
deny the non-democratic nature of the Court, an agency of the government
that wields important political power without responsibility to any constituency. In his chapter on the Court and democratic theory, Mr. Frank
says that the justices may get out of touch with the people (p. 148), that
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it is important that they keep in touch with the people (pp. 149-150), and
that diversity of background among the justices is "the best protection
against an excessively rarefied atmosphere" in the Court. (p. 153) The
conflict between the institution and democratic theory is acknowledged
(p. 155) and three answers are suggested: that the country is not a pure
democracy anyway; that the Court does not make policy; and the third,
which is the position Mr. Frank favors. This is an admission that the
Court does make policy. And this is a good thing, because it is a "check
to democratic impulsiveness" (p. 159), so long as it does not check democratic impulsiveness too hard, as when the Court is out of touch with the
"dominant thought of its time." (p. 154)
The next five chapters report on the way in which the non-democratic
Court has fulfilled its functions in various fields; and on the basis of Mr.
Frank's own conclusions, it is hard to justify the Court in the roles in
which he analyzes it. Has it worked significant results in the maintenance
of the Federal system? Mr. Frank says "the really stupendous alterations
in federal-state relationships have been largely the product of forces that
the Court could neither direct nor control." (p. 178) Has the Court been
the proverbial palladium of liberties, the shield and buckler of elementary
freedom? Mr. Frank says that with respect to freedom of speech and press,
the Court before the twentieth century "had no effect on American political liberties." (p. 183) When it moved into this area between 1918 and
1930, "it upheld not the freedom, but the restraint of the freedom" (p. 188);
and although some assistance to elementary liberty was supplied between
1930 and 1945,. the Court after 1945 abdicated the field it had started to
occupy. (p. 189) All in all, "the role of the Court in preserving the basic
American liberties of freedom of speech and of the press has been slight.
Its entry into the field on any terms is barely thirty years old, and it has
served more as.a ratifying than a restraining body." (p. 195)
How about the Court as a champion of due process in criminal cases?
In the supervision of state criminal justice in the past twenty-five years,
says Mr. Frank, "There is no area on the civil-rights horizon in which the
lines of Court policy are more fuzzy and unclear than in this one." (p. 223)
Mr. Frank does think, however, that the Court has "maintained a clean
line" (p. 216) in habeas corpus and martial law cases, but this conclusion
is certainly shaded by the Vallandigham case which the Court dodged,
and Mr. Frank does not mention, the Milligan case which was decided
when the Civil War was safely over, the Hawaiian cases which the Court
got after World War II was over and the Government had already restored the writ (p. 217), and the lynching of Yamashita with the Court's
help. (pp. 135-137) As to the civil rights of Negroes, it is hard to see where
the whole record of the Court deserves much applause when it is considered
that the justices gutted the powers of Congress in the Civil Rights cases
of 1883, made segregation the law of the Constitution in Plessy, enforced
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the white primary until 1944, enforced restrictive convenants until 1948,
and did not undo the damage of the Plessy case until almost sixty years
later. In the regulation of the economy, the Court enforced its business
views for at least forty years before it was intimidated into changing them.
And in the field of international relations, the Court just goes along as
indeed it should. It certainly simplifies governance for the Court to enforce
the same foreign policy as the rest of the country, without developing one
of its own.
The second question-the question of the double standard-is rather
more implicit than otherwise in Mr. Frank's work, although it is directly
connected with any judgment to be made about the role of the Court in
the American culture. Since 1937, the reasonable man has come to guide
the review the justices give to acts of economic regulation. Since few statutes
are inherently unreasonable (it takes majorities to enact them), most legislation that regulates the economy is valid, and is presumed to be so. But the
reasonable man might think that statutes to promote the security of the
country (however foolish) were necessary. The reasonable man should lead
the judges to support such statutes also, but some are reluctant to do so.
Instead the presumption of validity is reversed and there is talk about preferred freeedoms, two Fourteenth Amendments, clear and present dangers,
and so on. It is amusing to some that the reactionaries of 1935 supported
the Court then and deplored it in 1957, while the progressives of 1935
deplored the Court then and applauded it in 1957. In all of the rhetoric
about shields and bucklers, palladiums of liberty, and marble palaces, it
is never made clear that what is involved is not the· Court at all but what
Mannheim saw as the tension between the Ideologues and the Utopians.
It's not the principle of the thing at all that divides the two camps; it's
the money. That is to say, judgment about the role of the Court seems
to be a variable of the partisan commitment; and its utility in the American
system is often measured not on objective grounds, but by the degree that
it seems to serve partisan goals.
Mr. Frank attempts to hazard some forecasts about the short range and
the long range in the Court, but since he cannot know what the partisan
tendency in the country or the Court is going to be, the conclusions must
necessarily be indecisive. As he looks into the short range future, Mr. Frank
forecasts that the Court will "continue the path of moderation in the interpretation of regulatory statutes;" will hew to the now established line
in race relations; and probably will speak on issues of civil liberty with
"the voices of general moderation." It is significant to the author that
seven important newspapers, among which he includes the New York Times
and the Arizona Daily Star, support recent trends in the Court, all of these
papers also being "voices of moderation." In a thin mixture of metaphors,
Mr. Frank expects that the "weight of the Court" will "stay generally in
line" with "the spirit of these and similar voices."
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But what of the Court in the more distant future? Well, the country
is getting bigger and the Court isn't. To cope with an expected increase
in the volume of its business, there are five devices that the Court can use:
to enlarge the staff of the Court (clerks, that is) and delegate greater responsibilities to them-a bad but perhaps necessary solution, he thinks; to
increase the use of orders without opinions; to eliminate time-consuming
diversions that cut production, like too extensive opinions, too many dissents, and too many concurrences; to stop being too erudite and precious
and to solve "the big problems" by "hitting hard" because "every blow
must count," although this does not always mean the "ax" and never the
"scalpel" (p. 290); and finally, as a device for coping with volume, the
Court "can use its discretionary power to hear more cases." (p. 290) How
the Court is to cut down on its load by hearing more cases is not immediately clear.
Mr. Frank's book is not a major work, either of analysis or popularization. It is most interesting when he talks about the Court as an institution;
and iess useful when he talks about its product. But however its contents
may be judged, the appearance of the book is a pleasant sign of the revival of interest in the Court as a member of the federal trinity. In its
new found vigor, perhaps it will remember the price of hubris in the
recent past.
Earl Latham,
Professor of Political Science,
Amherst College

